EXPROPRIATION RENT AND COMMUTATIVE RENT IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE KHAZARIAN CASE

Abstract

Social theory provides a well-developed explanation of social transition from traditional order to modern order. However, it provides a one-dimensional view on traditional society despite the fact of multiple practices and institutions functioning within this type of social order. The paper deals with the issue of social change in traditional society. The author uses the case of the Khazarian rule on Ukrainian territories (forest-steppe and Crimea) as an illustration. The author uses archeological and other historical sources. Pre-modern polities were rent-seeking corporative actors. The social nature of rent includes such features as non-working origin and exclusive right to dispose of goods that rent-seeking actors are not producing. In addition, rent is opposed to value added. This paper provides a new way of looking at the social origin of rent. The author provides conceptual distinction between two types of rent: expropriation rent and commutative rent. The first type is based on violent expropriation of the goods from producers and/or owners. The second one is based on cooperative relations between elites and the rest of society, on creating conditions for productive economic and social activity. The simple indicator of the type of rent is the existence of a tax system. What can be found: regular and precise taxation or (ir)regular robbery? This indicator in pure form is relevant just for ancient and early Middle Ages polities in Europe. It needs some correction for later times. The transition from the first type to the second type changes social relations and institutions in polity. The pre-modern polity transforms from the “gang corporation” into a guarantor of safety. Safety was the first service that was provided by pre-modern polity. The Khazars controlled a huge territory without violent coercion for a long time. They integrated such territories, different tribes and peoples into a “trade empire” in which regions were interdependent economically: forest-steppe zone and Black sea region etc. They created a trade framework that motivated forest-steppe and Crimean inhabitants for intense and productive economic activity. Such activities were accompanied by cultural diffusion and innovations. The rulers of Kyivan lands copied such political technologies: regular taxation, trade activity and limited violence. They needed a century to intercept the dominance. The conceptual distinction between two types of rent is an analytical tool that can be used in various contexts. This conception provides a way of understanding social change in traditional society.